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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
JEANETTE OSGUTHORPE, ) 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff and ) 
Respondent, ) 
v. ) 
JERRY OSGUTHORPE, ) Case No. 890219-CA 
) District Ct. No. D87-4967 
Defendant and ) 
Appellant. ) Priority Classification 14b 
* * * * * 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to consider this appeal is vested in the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 3 and 4, and 
Utah Code Ann § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1989). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from certain provisions of the 
Findings f lit I Decree of Divorce executed and entered March 
1, 1989, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
presiding, which terminated the marriage of the parties, in 
particular, those provisions which set an amount to be paid as 
child support; those provisions which awarded and set an amount 
as alimony; those provisions which divided the real property of 
the parties; and those provisions which awarded attorney fees to 
- 1 -
the respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT UNFAIRLY DIVIDED THE INCOME OF 
THE PARTIES AND AWARDED EXCESSIVE AMOUNTS AS 
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT, LEAVING THE 
APPELLANT INSUFFICIENT INCOME ON WHICH TO 
SUPPORT HIMSELF. 
A. The alimony and child support awards 
are based upon erroneous Findings 
of Fact. 
B. The trial court has inequitably 
allocated the parties' financial and 
material resources. 
II. 
THE RESPONDENT IS CAPABLE OF SELF-SUPPORT AND 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING HER ALIMONY. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD TO 
THE APPELLANT GIFTS GIVEN TO HIM BY HIS FATHER 
DURING THE COURSE OF THE MARRIAGE, WHILE 
RETURNING TO THE RESPONDENT PROPERTY WHICH SHE 
OWNED PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE 
APPELLANT TO PAY ANY OF THE ATTORNEY' S FEES OF 
THE RESPONDENT, WHERE THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO 
MAKE A RECORD OF REASONABLENESS AND NEED AND 
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED RESPONDENT THE 
MAJORITY OF THE PROPERTY AND INCOME OF THE 
PARTIES. 
A. Respondent failed to establish the 
reasonableness of her costs and 
attorney fees. 
B. Respondent failed to establish a 




The following statutes are relevant to this case: 
30-3-5. D i s p o s i t i o n o ± p r o p e r t y -
Maintenance and health care of 
parties and children - Court to have 
continuing jurisdiction - Custody 
and visitation - Termination of 
alimony - Nonmeritorious petition 
for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is 
rendered, the court may include in 
it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, and parties. 
The court shall include the 
following in every decree of 
divorce: 
(a) An order assigning 
responsibility for the payment 
of reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children; and 
(b) If coverage is available 
at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate 
health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the 
dependent children. 
(2) The court may include, in an 
order determining child support, an 
o r d e r a s s i g n i n g f i n a n c i a l 
responsibility for all or a portion 
of child care expenses incurred on 
behalf of the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and 
that the dependent children would 
be adequately cared for, it may 
include an order allowing the non-
custodial parent to provide the day 
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care for the dependent ch i ld ren , 
necess i t a ted by the employment or 
t r a in ing of the custodial parent. 
(3) The c o u r t has c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n to make subsequent 
changes or new o r d e r s for the 
s u p p o r t and maintenance of the 
pa r t i e s , the custody of the chi ldren 
and t h e i r suppor t , maintenance , 
hea l th , and den ta l care, or the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of the property as i s 
reasonable and necessary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1)-(3) (1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
The parties were married on August 26, 1974 
(Transcript, hereinafter " T, " at 33), and separated on 
January 7, 1988 (T. 33, 308). Four children were born as issue 
of this marriage, ranging in age from 8 to 12 (T. 33). 
Although the parties were married while the appellant was in 
veterinary school, his education was financed by appellant' s 
father (T. 90, 187, 280). After graduation in 1977 (T. 99), 
appellant commenced employment as a consultant to his father' s 
veterinary clinic, which employment continued to the present. 
(T. 99-100). Appellant is an independent contractor in his 
working relationship with his father and is paid $2,000. 00 per 
month for his services (T. 80, 92, 102, 125, 158, 260, 267-
68, 287, 329). From that compensation, he must pay his own 
business expenses (T. 222-23), but he receives no employee 
benefits (T. 102,267). During the marriage, appellant was 
given the payments from a barn rental in Park City, Utah, of 
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$350.00 per month, as a gift from his father (T. 92-94, 160, 
166, 329). 
The appellant testified that he was thirty-seven years 
old at the time of trial (T. 99). He further testified that he 
incurs $154. 89 a month for taxes and incurs business expenses 
of $1,001.31 per month, leaving him with a net monthly income, 
including the barn rental gift, as long as it continues, of 
$1,192.00 per month (T. 92, 179). He had actual and 
anticipated living expenses of $2,049.60 per month 
(Defendant's Exhibit 36). 
The respondent was thirty-five years old at the time of 
trial and in good health (T. 31-32, 86, 89). Despite an eye 
injury received prior to the marriage (T. 32), she was an avid 
tennis player (T. 86), and was able to assist her husband in 
maintenance of the parties' home and on the farm owned by 
appellant's father (T. 42, 89-90, 185-86, 236-37, 306-07). She 
graduated from the University of Utah in 1975 with a Bachelor 
of Science Degree (T. 35) and was two hours away from receiving 
a current teaching certificate (T. 36, 87). She intended to 
secure a teaching position as soon as possible (T. 39). 
Respondent had rental income in the sum of $500.00 and 
expenses of $340. 00 per month against that rental, giving her 
a net rental income of $160.00 per month (T. 44). She was 
employed as an insurance claims processor with a net monthly 
wage of $770.00 per month (T. 31, 83, 86, 182). The court 
determined that she had living expenses of $2,027.00 per 
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month (Findings of Fact, paragraph 6 at 4). 
At trial, respondent sought $175.00 per child per month 
as child support (T. 51). Respondent also sought alimony in 
the sum of $250. 00 per month, terminable upon her death, 
remarriage or cohabitation (T. 51). Appellant testified that 
the sum of $125.00 per child per month was reasonable as child 
support (T. 136), and requested that child support be abated 
by fifty percent during extended visitation (T. 204). He 
testified that he believed that respondent should not be 
entitled to alimony because of her earning ability (T. 136, 
195, 237-38). 
The trial court ordered the appellant to pay child 
support of $150. 00 per month for each of the four minor 
children of the parties (T. 347), a total sum of $600.00 per 
month. The appellant was also ordered to pay the respondent 
$150.00 per month as alimony for five (5) years, at the end of 
which time alimony would reduce to $1.00 a year for five (5) 
additional years, then terminate (T. 350). The total sum of 
alimony and child support awarded to respondent was $750.00 
per month. The court indicated that it believed that the 
appellant had more income than he was demonstrating, although 
the court did not know how much (T. 3 50). 
The respondent had a home on Hillrise Circle which she 
owned before the marriage of the parties (T. 45, 56, 59, 135). 
During the marriage, the parties lived there and improved the 
home (T. 43, 89-90, 123, 184-85, 235-36, 352), then, bought a 
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home on Chris Lane (T. 66). A real estate appraiser whose 
qualification was stipulated, testified that, in his opinion, 
the fair market value of the Hillrise home in August, 1974, 
was $34,000.00 (T. 207, 209), and was $61,500.00 in May, 1988 
(T. 210). He also testified that improvements made during the 
marriage by the parties on the Hillrise home would have 
enhanced the value of the home (T. 218). 
The father of the appellant gave the appellant a number 
of cash gifts during different years throughout the marriage 
(T. 90-91, 125-26, 168, 186-87, 194, 225-27, 239, 286, 357). 
The appellant' s father made available a loan in the sum of 
$18, 500. 00 which provided the downpayment on the Chris Lane 
home; later, Dr. Osguthorpe, Sr. , paid off that obligation as 
a gift to his son (T. 67-70, 191-193, 281-85). 
The trial court found that the Hillrise Circle home was 
the respondent' s premarital property and awarded all interest 
in it to her (T. 352), despite the testimony concerning 
appellant' s contributions to that property. The court found 
that the Chris Lane home was joint property, despite the 
testimony of the appellant' s father that he had given gifts to 
just the appellant which the appellant put into the home (T. 
195, 225-27, 280-82), and the equity of approximately 
$43,000.00 was divided between the parties (T. 72, 353). Other 
than the mortgages on the Hillrise Circle and Chris Lane 
homes, the parties had no debts (T. 178). 
Respondent sought attorney' s fees in this matter. Her 
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attorney proffered, following the close of the first day of a 
two-day trial, that he concentrated his practice in domestic 
relations law (T. 241). He also proffered that he believed 
his hourly rate of $100.00 per hour was reasonable and offered 
to make available to the trial court his time records (T. 242). 
The estimated total of costs and attorney7 s fees incurred by 
respondent was $7,869.30 (T. 311). Appellant did not agree 
that he should be responsible for those fees or that the 
amounts proffered were reasonable (T. 44-45, 312). The court 
awarded respondent $3,939. 65 of an estimated $7,800.00 in 
attorney fees incurred by her and ordered the appellant to pay 
them (T. 241-245, 311, 359). 
Appellant challenged the findings and decision of the 
trial court on February 28, 1989. The court affirmed its 
decision (T. of February 28th hearing at 2-14). Appellant 
also timely moved for relief from judgment, or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial which was denied by the trial 
court. The appellant pursues this appeal, challenging the 
trial court' s findings and asserts that the trial court has 
not fairly and equitably divided the income and property of 
the parties. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial courts have considerable discretion in adjusting 
the financial and property interests of parties in a divorce, 
and the decision of the trial court is presumed valid. Ruhsam 
v. Ruhsam, 742 P. 2d 123, 124 (Utah App. 1987). This 
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presumption is overcome where appellant shows that the trial 
court misunderstood or misapplied the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error; or that the evidence 
clearly preponderated against the findings; or that such a 
serious inequity results so as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. I_d. In determining whether an error has been 
made by the trial court, the appellate court may review both 
the facts and the law. Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P. 2d 700, 701 
(Utah 1985). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
On appeal, appellant challenges certain Finding of Fact 
by the trial court as being clearly erroneous in light of the 
evidence presented and the trial court's adjudication as to 
the financial affairs and properties of the parties is so 
inequitable that it manifests an abuse of discretion which 
should be corrected. 
Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court 
misapplied Utah law regarding the equitable distribution of 
property acquired by one spouse as a gift from his father 
during the course of the marriage and the distribution of the 
enhanced value of premarital assets. These were unfairly 
distributed based upon erroneous Findings and Conclusions and 
the court failed to enter sufficient Findings of Fact with 
respect to respondent' s need for, and reasonableness of, costs 




THE TRIAL COURT UNFAIRLY DIVIDED THE INCOME OF THE 
PARTIES AND AWARDED EXCESSIVE AMOUNTS AS ALIMONY 
AND C H I L D S U P P O R T , LEAVING THE A P P E L L A N T 
INSUFFICIENT INCOME ON WHICH TO SUPPORT HIMSELF. 
A. THE ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
ARE BASED UPON ERRONEOUS FINDINGS 
OF FACT. 
After conclusion of the trial in this matter, the 
trial court ordered appellant to pay to the respondent the sum 
of $150.00 per month as and for alimony for a period of five 
years. At the end of five years, the alimony award was 
reduced to the sum of $1.00 per year for an additional five-
year period until such time as the respondent remarries, 
cohabits or dies. (Decree of Divorce, paragraph 7, at 4). 
The trial court also ordered appellant to pay to respondent 
the sum of $150.00 per month as child support for each of the 
four minor children of the parties until each child reaches 
the age of eighteen or graduates from high school in his 
normal year of graduation, whichever occurs last. (Decree of 
Divorce, paragraph 6 at 4). The total sum of alimony and 
child support awarded to respondent was $750.00 per month. 
This award left the appellant with a net income of $442.00 per 
month on which to support himself. 
The award to respondent of the sum of $750.00 per month 
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as alimony and child support was based upon the trial court' s 
Finding that, "[T]he Defendant receives more money by way of 
monthly income than was reflected on Defendant7 s Exhibit 36" 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 6, at 5). The trial court 
indicated that it believed the appellant had more income than 
he was demonstrating, although the court did not know how 
much (T. 350). Appellant challenged the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law of the trial court on February 28, 1989, 
but the decision was affirmed. (T. of February 28th hearing 
at 2-14). 
On appeal, the Findings of Fact, "shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1989). The 
appellate court will overturn a factual resolution by the 
trial court if the appellant "marshals all the evidence 
supporting the trial court' s finding and demonstrates that 
that evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so 
lacking as to warrant the conclusion that a clear error has 
been committed. " Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P. 2d 1276, 1278 
(Utah 1987). Likewise, the trial court's decision will be 
overturned if its Findings of Fact are not sufficiently 
detailed as to all factors contained in the statute for 
determination of the amount of support, Jeffries v. 
Jeffries, 752 P. 2d 909, 911 (Utah App. 1988), unless "the 
facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
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supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." Anderson 
v. Anderson. 757 P. 2d 476, 478 (Utah App. 1988). 
The trial court made two substantial errors in entering 
its Findings of Fact upon which alimony and child support in 
this case were based. First, the trial court7 s finding as to 
appellant' s income was clearly erroneous in light of the 
evidence presented. Second, the findings upon which alimony 
and child support were based do not sufficiently disclose 
whether the trial court took into account the crucial factors 
in setting that award. With regard to the first error, the 
trial court stated in rendering its decision: 
Again, Mr. Kasting did bring out the 
situation as far as the amount of money that 
was left there as far as to support the family 
on, which was just not reasonable. So there 
is no question that there is more money in the 
home than the tax reports show as far as the 
amount of net income. I am not in the 
position to go through and to make a definite 
finding as to just what amount is present 
there. I know what the tax return says. I 
know what is taken off as far as -- and I 
looked them over -- as far as business 
expenses and so forth. 
Well, that' s between these two parties 
and the IRS, and that' s what takes place. 
Therefore, I have nothing to say concerning 
that except they did have more money in the 
home to operate on. But I don' t know how 
much. (T. at 349-350). 
The only reasonable conclusion for the trial court to 
make given the evidence presented was that appellant had a 
gross income of approximately $2, 350. 00 per month as long as 
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the barn rental gift continued. Trial of this case extended 
over two days, and the record is replete with evidence that 
bears upon the income issue and that supports that conclusion. 
The appellant testified that he was thirty-seven years old at 
the time of trial (T. 99), and that he worked as an independent 
contractor to his father' s veterinary clinic earning $2,000.00 
per month (T. 80, 92, 102, 125, 158, 260, 267-68, 287, 329). 
From that, he must pay his own business expenses (T. 222-23), 
leaving him with a net monthly income, including $350. 00 per 
month from the barn rental, of $1, 192. 00 per month (T. 92, 
179). 
During trial, respondent introduced the parties' tax 
return, arguing that appellant' s total monthly income was 
actually $2,350.00. But respondent also testified at trial 
that she prepared the parties' tax returns and that her 
husband grosses about $2,000.00 a month, and has a net income 
of slightly over $1,000.00 per month (T. at 92, 302). 
The trial court' s conclusion that appellant earned more 
than $2, 000. 00 per month appears to be based upon a belief 
that the appellant should be earning a greater sum of money 
than the evidence reflected since appellant is in the 
veterinary profession (T. 348). Yet, the Utah Supreme Court 
has affirmed a trial court award of a nominal sum of child 
support based upon evidence that reflected an unusually low 
income. See, e. g. , Jorgensen v. Joraensen, 667 P. 2d 22, 23 
(Utah 1983). 
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The problem is compounded by the fact that since the 
trial court entered no finding as to appellant' s income, the 
court failed to provide a baseline for modification purposes. 
See, e. g. , Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P. 2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 
App. 1989). In this case, the trial court should have based 
its findings on the evidence rather than speculating as to the 
doctor' s income and making an award of alimony and child 
support based upon that speculation. 
In the absence of any evidence contrary to appellant' s 
testimony as to his earnings, any other conclusion as to the 
amount of appellant's earnings is merely conjecture. 
"Notwithstanding the equitable powers of the district court in 
interfamily controversies in divorce matters, and the 
acknowledged broad latitude of discretion allowed therein, the 
court cannot act arbitrarily, or on supposition or conjecture 
as to facts upon which to justify its order. " Iverson v. 
Iverson, 526 P. 2d 1126, 1127 (Utah 1974). Similarly, the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated in King v. King, 478 P. 2d 492, 495-
496 (Utah 1970) that, "[w]e remain aware of the prerogatives 
and the broad discretion accorded the trial court in matters 
of divorce. Nevertheless, this certainly does not extend to 
an arbitrary and unreasoning power to disregard credible, 
uncontradicted evidence and make findings inconsistent 
therewith and issue an order based thereon.'* 
Secondly, the trial court failed to enter findings of 
fact sufficiently detailed as to the statutory factors 
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considered in determining the level of alimony and child 
support awarded to respondent. The trial court' s failure to 
consider the statutory factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 
78-45-7 (3) (1989) for child support is an abuse of 
discretion. See Jeffries, 752 P. 2d at 911. Likewise, in 
setting the level of alimony the court must consider, "the 
financial condition and needs of the spouse claiming support, 
the ability of that spouse to provide sufficient income for 
him or herself, and the ability of the responding spouse to 
provide this support." Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P. 2d 952, 958 
(Utah App. 1988). 
In Stevens, the trial court decision relating to 
alimony and child support was reversed by the court of appeals 
because the trial court made only limited, conclusory findings 
of fact regarding alimony and child support. 754 P. 2d at 958. 
The court of appeals found that the trial court had failed to 
address the financial conditions, needs and abilities of each 
spouse. Id. at 958. Furthermore, the trial court had failed 
to make explicit findings regarding the statutory factors 
pertinent to a child support determination. Id. 
In this case, the parties disputed the amount of 
appellant' s income. The trial court found that with respect 
to alimony, "the defendant receives more money by way of 
monthly income than was reflected on defendant' s Exhibit 36. " 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 6 at 5). The trial court 
rejected appellant's evidence as to income but did not 
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specifically determine the ability of appellant to provide 
support as required by Utah law. 
With respect to child support, the trial court 
concluded that "Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff the sum 
of $150. 00 per month for each of the four minor children of 
the parties, as child support, for a total child support 
obligation of $600.00 per month." (Findings of Fact, 
Paragraph 7 at 5). The trial court's Findings of Fact with 
respect to child support were as conclusory as the Findings 
regarding child support in Stevens and did not consider any of 
the factors enumerated by Utah law. See Jeffries, 752 P. 2d 
at 911. Because the court believed that it was unable to 
discern appellant' s ability to earn, the court necessarily 
could not determine an appropriate level of child support. 
The trial court' s Findings of Fact with respect to alimony and 
child support in this case are insufficiently detailed, and 
are not supported by the evidence. Consequently, an award 
based upon the Findings of Fact as they now stand constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. This is compounded by the fact that 
the respondent keeps all of her earnings and all but 
approximately $445. 00 per month of appellant' s earnings—a 
total of $1,680. 00 to appellant' s $442. 00--which is clearly 
inequitable. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT HAS INEQUITABLY ALLOCATED THE 
PARTIES' FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL RESOURCES. 
The net effect of the order based upon the trial 
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court's erroneous and insufficient Findings of Fact has been 
exacerbated by an inequitable^ allocation of the parties' 
financial and property resources so that appellant is 
currently in distress because he has insufficient income on 
which to support himself. 
The Court of Appeals is required to act because of the 
violation of the duty of the trial court, in marital 
dissolution proceedings, to render a decision permitting: 
[T]he best possible allocation of the property and 
the economic resources of the parties so that the 
parties and their children can pursue their lives 
in as happy and useful a manner as possible. If it 
appears that the decree is so discordant with an 
equitable allocation that it will more likely lead 
to further difficulties and distress than to serve 
the desired objective, then a reappraisal of the 
decree must be undertaken. 
Read v. Read, 594 P. 2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979). 
In this case, appellant will have the sum of $442. 00 
per month upon which to relocate and set up a household, as 
well as pay his everyday expenses, while the respondent will 
have the sum of $1, 680. 00 per month. In addition, the 
respondent was awarded both homes which were before the court 
for division, all of the household furnishings, the family 
vehicle and approximately $4,000. 00 in attorney' s fees. 
There is no indication that the trial court considered the 
fact that the respondent was awarded income-producing property 
in reducing or eliminating the need for alimony or child 
support as required in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P. 2d 304, 
308 (Utah 1988); Noble v. Noble. 761 P. 2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 
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1988); and Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P. 2d 696 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the issues of alimony 
and property division are not entirely separable." Noble, 761 
P. 2d at 1373. 
[N]either the trial court nor this Court 
considers the property division in a vacuum. 
The amount of alimony awarded and the relative 
earning capabilities of the parties are also 
relevant, because the relative abilities of the 
spouses to support themselves after the divorce 
are pertinent to an equitable determination of 
the division of the fixed assets of the 
marriage. I_d. 
Appellant requests that this court reverse the trial 
court' s decision on the grounds that the net effect of the 
allocation of property and income between these parties will 
leave appellant unable to pursue his life happily and 
usefully. 
II. 
THE RESPONDENT IS CAPABLE OF SELF-SUPPORT AND THE 
COURT ERRED IN AWARDING HER ALIMONY. 
Following the trial in this matter, the appellant was 
ordered to pay to the respondent $150.00 per month as alimony 
for five years, at the end of which time alimony would reduce 
to $1. 00 a year for five additional years and then terminate. 
(T. 350). In rendering a decision which awards alimony, the 
trial court must examine several relevant factors including 
the financial condition and needs of the spouse, the ability 
of each spouse to produce income, the length of marriage, the 
recipient spouse' s education and employability. Boyle v. 
Bovle, 735 P. 2d 669, 671 (Utah App. 1987). 
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Issues of alimony and property division are not 
entirely separable and the trial may consider the property 
division as well as the relative earning capabilities of the 
parties. Noble v. Noble, 761 P. 2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988). 
"The fact that one spouse has inherited or donated property, 
particularly if it is income-producing, may properly be 
considered as eliminating or reducing the need for alimony by 
that spouse or as a source of income for the payment of child 
support or alimony (where awarded) by that spouse. " Mortensen 
v. Mortensen, 760 P. 2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988); See also Johnson 
v. Johnson, 771 P. 2d 696 (Utah App. 1989). 
The evidence in this case showed that respondent was 
thirty-five years old at the time of trial and in good health 
(T. 31-32, 86, 89). Despite an eye injury received prior to 
the marriage (T. 32), she was an avid tennis player (T. 86) 
and was able to assist her husband in the maintenance of the 
parties' home and on the farm owned by appellant' s father (T. 
42, 89-90, 185-86, 236-37, 306-07). Respondent graduated 
from the University of Utah in 1975 with a Bachelor of Science 
degree (T. 35). At the time of trial, she was two hours away 
from receiving a current teaching certificate and intended to 
secure a teaching position as soon as possible (T. 36, 39, 
87). Respondent's earnings were approximately $770.00 per 
month and she received an additional $160.00 per month as net 
rental income (T. 31, 44, 83, 86, 182). 
Appellant is an independent contractor in his working 
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relationship with his father and is paid $2, 000. 00 per month 
as a consultant (T. 80, 92, 102, 125, 158, 260, 267-68, 287, 
329). From that, he must pay his own business expenses 
(T.222-23). He receives no employee benefits from his father 
(T. 102,267). Appellant's net earnings after payment of 
business expenses are approximately $1,192.00 per month 
(T. 92, 179). 
The parties in this case were married approximately 
fourteen years (T. 33,308). The trial court awarded respondent 
all of the household furnishings, the family car, the 
possession of the marital home for her use and the children' s 
use and awarded her the entire equity in the home on Hillrise 
Circle which she held before the marriage of the parties and 
which was, at the time of trial, being utilized as income-
producing property (T. 44). During the marriage, the parties 
had lived in the Hillrise Circle home, and appellant had 
contributed to numerous improvements on that home (T. 43, 89-
90, 123, 184-85, 235-36, 352). Other than the mortgages on 
Hillrise Circle and Chris Lane homes, the parties had no debts 
(T. 178). The court also awarded respondent almost $4,000.00 
in attorney's fees. (T. 241-245, 311, 359). The net effect 
of the trial court' s decision was to place appellant in the 
position of having substantial anticipated living expenses in 
establishing his own separate household, as well as having to 
pay over one-half of his net earnings for the support and 
maintenance of the respondent and children. 
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In a case remarkably similar to this case, the Utah 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court' s decision not to 
award alimony following a seven-year marriage in view of the 
fact the wife was awarded most of the marital estate as well 
as her premarital assets. Boyle, 735 P. 2d at 672. In Boyle, 
medical testimony was received regarding the wife' s asthmatic 
condition which adversely affected her ability to become 
employed, as well as evidence of the fact that she was able to 
play golf frequently. Additionally, testimony was received 
concerning the unusually low level of earnings from the 
husband' s professional law practice. Id. at 672. Finally, 
the appellate court noted that the wife was awarded most of 
the marital estate as well as the residue of her premarital 
assets. This case offers a more compelling reason than Boyle 
not to award alimony. Here, respondent was given the vast 
majority of marital property as well as her premarital 
assets, but, unlike the wife in Boyle, it is undisputed that 
she is capable of self-support. 
Alimony should not have been awarded in this case given 
the similarity in the amount of net earnings of the parties, 
and the substantial amount of property awarded to respondent. 
The award of alimony by the trial court constitutes an abuse 
of discretion requiring this court to reverse the decision of 
the trial court. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD TO THE 
APPELLANT GIFTS GIVEN TO HIM BY HIS FATHER DURING 
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THE COURSE OF THE MARRIAGE, WHILE RETURNING TO THE 
RESPONDENT PROPERTY WHICH SHE OWNED PRIOR TO THE 
MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES, AND BY FAILING TO AWARD 
APPELLANT INTEREST ON THE PROPERTY AWARD. 
The court7 s ruling misapplied Utah law to this case in 
that the decision is inconsistent with Mortensen v. Mortensen, 
760 P. 2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added) where the Utah 
Supreme Court declared: 
We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making 
"equitable" property division pursuant to 
section 30-3-5 should, in accordance with the 
rule prevailing in most other jurisdictions and 
with the division made in many of our own 
cases, generally award property acquired by one 
spouse by gift and inheritance during the 
marriage (or property acquired in exchange 
thereof) to that spouse, together with any 
appreciation or enhancement of its values 
unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her 
efforts or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that 
property, ... or (2) the property has been 
consumed or its identity lost through combining 
or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has 
made a gift of an interest therein to the other 
spouse. 
See also Preston v. Preston. 646 P. 2d 705 (Utah 1982). 
While there are exceptions to the declared rule, none 
are applicable to the instant case. Accordingly, the trial 
court erred in failing to award to the appellant the 
$18, 500. 00 gift given to him by his father, plus the increase 
in value attributable to that gift after purchase of the Chris 
Lane home. 
The appellant' s father testified that he gifted only to 
his son the funds for the Chris Lane home. The court rejected 
this testimony without a valid basis for its action. 
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Ironically, the court understood the basic legal principle as 
can be seen by the decision regarding the Hillrise Circle 
property. While the Mortensen decision supports the court in 
its ruling in the Hillrise Circle property, it demonstrates 
that the court did not correctly apply that doctrine to the 
Chris Lane property. Appellant7 s father made available to the 
parties a loan in the sum of $18, 500. 00 which the parties 
used as a downpayment for the Chris Lane home. In January, 
1981, appellant's father paid off the balance on the 
$18,5000.00 loan (T. 68). Rational application of the 
Mortensen decision requires that all equity in the home of the 
parties at Chris Lane be awarded to the appellant as it was 
acquired by means of gifts from his father. The award of the 
Chris Lane property to appellant would then return to him the 
gifts given to him by his father. Pursuant to Mortensen and 
Preston, interest on and the natural enhancement of his 
contributions during the marriage should apply toward the 
enhancement of the value of respondent7 s premarital property 
and the gifts given to him by his father. Interest should 
aPPly on the judgment pursuant to Marchant v. Marchant, 743 
P. 2d 199, 206-07 (UtahApp. 1987). 
The trial court also erred in its ruling in regard to 
the financial gifts to appellant by his father. Despite 
hearing testimony of Dr. Osguthorpe, the appellant7 s father, 
that the gifts were intended for his son and not the parties 
jointly, the trial court rejected his testimony and ignored 
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the intent or the donor. The Court of Appeals has ruled 
previously in Smith v. Smith, 738 P. 2d 655 (Utah App. 1987) 
that the trial court should hear and consider the testimony of 
a parent giving a gift to his/her child, although apparently 
giving a gift put in both names. This Court should effect the 
gift given by Dr. Osguthorpe to his son, the appellant, and 
reform the decision heretofore made in this matter 
accordingly. 
Finally, the trial court decreed that respondent' s 
interest in the Chris Lane home is, "subject to a non-interest 
bearing equitable lien in the Defendant for one-half of the 
present equity in the home," (Decree, paragraph 12, at 5 and, 
further, that this lien, "shall be paid to Defendant when the 
Plaintiff remarries, cohabits, sells the home or moves from 
the home, or when the youngest child reaches the age of 
majority, whichever is first to occur." (Ijl. at 5-6). The 
trial court erred in its failure to award appellant interest 
on the property award in an amount of 12% per annum as 
required by law. See Marchant, 743 P. 2d at 206-207. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT TO 
PAY ANY OF THE COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES OF THE 
RESPONDENT WHERE THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO MAKE A 
RECORD OF REASONABLENESS AND NEED, AND WHERE THE 
TRIAL COURT AWARDED RESPONDENT THE MAJORITY OF THE 
PROPERTY AND INCOME OF THE PARTIES. 
A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE 
REASONABLENESS OF HER COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
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To establish the right to an award of costs and 
attorney's fees, it is well settled that the evidence 
presented at trial must reflect both financial need and 
reasonableness. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331, 1336 (Utah 
App. 1988). In this case, the trial court erred in ordering 
the appellant to pay any of the costs and attorney' s fees of 
respondent where the respondent failed to make a record of the 
reasonableness of fees or of her financial need, particularly 
in light of the fact that the trial court awarded respondent 
the majority of the property, as well as alimony and child 
support measuring more than one-half of appellant' s earnings. 
The reasonableness of attorney's fees is not measured 
by what an attorney actually bills or the number of hours 
spent on the case. Rasband, 752 P. 2d at 1336. Rather, in 
determining the reasonableness of attorney' s fees: 
A court may consider, among other factors, the 
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of 
the attorneys in presenting the case, the 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on 
the case, the fee customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services, the amount 
involved in the case and the result attained, 
and the expertise and the experience of the 
attorneys involved. Id. 
The trial court may not award attorney's fees, "where 
there is nothing in the record to sustain the award either by 
way of evidence or by stipulation of the parties as to how the 
court may fix it." Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P. 2d 27,28 (Utah 
1984). The issue of reasonableness of attorney's fees is a 
question of fact to which respondent bears the burden of 
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proof. Failing to prove the reasonableness of attorney' s fees 
has the same effect as would the failure to offer proof as to 
any other controverted issue. 
In this case, respondent' s attorney proffered following 
the close of the first day of a two-day trial that he 
concentrated his practice in domestic relations law (T. 241). 
He also proffered that he believed his hourly rate of $100.00 
per hour was reasonable and offered to make available to the 
trial court his time records (T. 242). Appellant did not 
agree that he should be responsible for those fees or that the 
amounts proffered were reasonable (T. 44-45, at 312). In fact, 
appellant argued that respondent had attempted throughout the 
proceedings to create marital assets out of property clearly 
belonging to appellant's father (T. 332). Respondent offered 
nothing by way of argument as to the difficulty of the 
litigation or the efficiency of her attorney. Instead, her 
attorney simply offered to make available to the trial court 
his time records (T. 242). 
Respondent' s offer to produce time records, without 
more, constitutes a failure of proof sufficient to entitle her 
to an award of costs and attorney' s fees. In Talley v. 
Talley, 739 P. 2d 83, 84 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that the evidence in that divorce action was 
insufficient to support an award of attorney' s fees to the 
wife where evidence was absent regarding the reasonableness 
of the fees requested. The appellate court reasoned: 
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At the close of plaintiff s case, her counsel 
proffered testimony and produced an exhibit 
itemizing the time and costs expended by him, 
his associate, and his clerk, and the hourly 
rates charged for each. Conspicuously absent 
is any evidence "regarding the necessity of the 
number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of 
the rate charged in light of the difficulty of 
the case and the result accomplished, and the 
rates commonly charged for divorce actions in 
the community. " Id. (quoting Kerr v. Kerr, 610 
P. 2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980)). 
Similarly, in Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy 
Ass7 n, 657 P. 2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982), the appellate court 
held that there was inadequate evidence to support an award of 
attorney' s fees where the parties stipulated to presentation 
of detailed billing records to the court as the evidentiary 
basis upon which the court could determine the reasonableness 
of the fee award for the prevailing party. In Mueller, the 
record indicated that the trial court' s award of attorney' s 
fees was not based on the evidence of the billing records, but 
rather was derived wholly from the post-trial statement of 
counsel. Because the award was made without adequate evidence 
to support it, the appellate court determined that the trial 
court' s award of attorney' s fees constituted an abuse of 
discretion which must be overruled. 
B. RESPONDENT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A 
NEED FOR AN AWARD OF HER COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
The second prong in determining whether the trial 
court's award of attorney' s fees should be sustained is 
whether there has been presented evidence of need and the 
relative ability of the respective parties to shoulder the 
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expenses of the litigation. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P. 2d 1380, 1384 
(Utah 1980). Like the facts in Kerr, at no point in these 
proceedings did respondent address the issue as to whether she 
would be able to cover the cost of litigation or the fact that 
she would be in a better position than her husband, in light 
of the substantial property settlement in her favor, to 
furnish her counsel with compensation. 
The evidence shows that respondent was working and 
earning a net income of $770.00 per month (T. 31, 83, 86, 
182), and had a net rental income of $160.00 per month (T. 44). 
Her total net income of $930.00 should be contrasted to that 
of the appellant7 s net income of $1, 192. 00 which will be 
further reduced to the sum of $442.00 per month after he pays 
the alimony and child support that was awarded for the benefit 
of respondent and the children. Additionally, appellant has 
been ordered to pay respondent7 s attorney7 s fees, as well as 
find resources that will permit him to establish his own 
separate household since respondent was given all of the 
household furnishings and furniture, the family car and 
possession of both homes owned by the parties. 
Because the respondent failed to produce evidence as to 
the reasonableness of her costs and attorney7 s fees, as well 
as financial need, the trial court abused its discretion in 
ordering that appellant pay any of respondent7 s attorney7 s 
fees and that portion of the decision should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed numerous errors in this case. 
The Findings of Fact entered by the trial court as to 
appellant' s income were clearly erroneous and, consequently, 
the award of alimony and child support are not supported by 
the evidence. The respondent is clearly capable of self-
support, yet was given alimony, all of her premarital assets, 
the overwhelming majority of the marital assets, and over one-
half of the attorney' s fees she requested. 
The trial court misapplied Utah law by failing to award 
the appellant gifts given to him by his father during the 
course of the marriage, by refusing to award the appellant any 
share in his efforts to enhance the value of his wife' s 
premarital property, or any interest on the judgment that was 
entered in his favor. 
Finally, the trial court erred in awarding the 
respondent her costs and attorney' s fees based upon her 
failure to bear her burden of proof. 
This appellate court should rectify this gross 
miscarriage of justice by: 
(1) Determining that respondent is not entitled to 
alimony; 
(2) Returning to appellant the Chris Lane property; 
(3) Reversing the award of costs and attorney's fees; 
and by, 
(4) Remanding this case to the trial court to reset 
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child support in accordance with applicable child support 
guidelines. 
DATED this 3~Q day of C^^^y&^s^\
 g 1989. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo-
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant. 
anions 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D87-4967 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
— oOo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
the 17th and 18th days of August, 1988. The Plaintiff 
appeared in person and was represented by her counsel, Kent 
M. Kasting, Esq., and the Defendant appeared in person and 
was represented by his counsel, David S. Dolowitz, Esq., the 
parties were sworn, testimony was taken of the parties and 
other witnesses, documentary evidence was introduced and the 
matter was argued to the Court. The Court considered all of 
the foregoing and ruled from the bench. Being fully advised 
in the matter, the Court made Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Jurisdiction. The Plaintiff and Defendant are 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and have been 
so for more than three months immediately prior to the filing 
of this action for divorce. 
2. Marriage Information, The Plaintiff and Defendant 
were married on the 26th day of August, 1974, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and separated on the 26th day of December, 1987. 
3. Decree of Divorce. During the course of this 
marriage, irreconcilable differences have arisen between the 
parties to the extent that the parties no longer desire to 
live together or to continue the marriage relationship, and 
the Court finds that each of the parties is awarded a Decree 
of Divorce from the other, which Decree is final upon signing 
and entry. 
4. Injunction, Each party is permanently enjoined and 
restrained from in any way bothering, harming or annoying the 
other; from in any way making disparaging remarks about the 
other in front of the children or any third parties; and from 
coming on or to the residential premises of the parties. 
5. Child Custody and Visitation. Four children have 
been born as issue of this marriage, namely, Jeffrey, born 
July 12, 1976; John, born April 30, 1978; and twins, Julie 
and Jennifer, born October 9, 1980. Plaintiff shall be and 
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is awarded the permanent care, custody and control of these 
children, subject to Defendant's reasonable rights of 
visitation, which rights of visitation should include the 
following: 
A. Alternating weekends; 
B. One evening each week until 8:00 o'clock 
p.m. 
C. Alternating red-letter holidays; 
D. Christmas visitation beginning Christmas 
Day at noon, until December 26th at 8:00 o'clock 
p.m., and one-half of the Christmas vacation then 
remaining; 
E. Thanksgiving in odd-numbered years; 
F. Defendant's birthday; 
G. Father's Day; 
H. One-half of each child's birthday, when 
that birthday falls on a non-school day; or 6:00 
o'clock p.m. to 8:00 o'clock p.m., if that birthday 
falls on a school day; or at such other times as 
the parties may agree between them; 
I. Six weeks each summer, not necessarily 
consecutive, and as may be agreed upon by the 
parties. 
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6. Child Support* Commencing with the month of 
September, 1988, Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum 
of $150.00 per month for each of the four minor children of 
the parties, as child support, for a total child support 
obligation of $600.00 per month. This child support shall 
continue until each child reaches the age of eighteen or 
graduates from high school in his normal year of graduation, 
whichever occurs last. 
7. Alimony. Commencing with the month of September, 
1988, the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$150.00 per month, as and for alimony, for a period of five 
years. At the end of five years, that alimony award shall be 
reduced to the sum of $1.00 per year for an additional five-
year period, or until such time as the Plaintiff remarries, 
cohabits or dies, whichever of the four events is first to 
occur. 
8« Health Insurance. Defendant shall provide such 
health insurance on each child during each child's respective 
period of minority. Defendant shall cooperate with the 
Plaintiff to assist her in converting their present health 
insurance coverage to individual coverage for the Plaintiff 
under the provisions of Cobra. Plaintiff shall be 
responsible for her own health insurance premiums and medical 
expenses. 
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9. Uninsured Medical Expenses. Any medical, dental, 
optometric and orthodontic expenses of the children not 
covered by insurance shall be shared equally by the parties, 
10. Life Insurance. The Defendant presently has a life 
insurance policy on his life, with a face value of 
$90,000.00, and Defendant shall continue in force that life 
insurance policy, with the Plaintiff and each of the four 
minor children to be named as equal beneficiaries thereunder, 
for so long as the Defendant has obligations of alimony and 
child support to the Plaintiff. 
11. Hillrise Circle Home. The Hillrise Circle home, 
and any appreciation related to this home, belongs to the 
Plaintiff and is awarded to her free and clear of any claim 
of the Defendant. Defendant shall execute a Quit-Claim Deed 
in the Plaintiff's favor in relation to this property. 
12. Chris Lane Home. The parties have an interest in a 
home and real property located at 7049 Chris Lane, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The Plaintiff and the four minor children of the 
parties are in need of this residence Plaintiff is awarded 
the exclusive use and occupancy of the same. However, 
Plaintiff's interest in this home shall be subject to a non-
interest bearing equitable lien in the Defendant for one-half 
of the present equity in the home, as found by the Court, to-
wit: the lien amount should be $22,500.00. This lien shall 
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be paid to Defendant when the Plaintiff remarries, cohabits, 
sells the home or moves from the home, or when the youngest 
child reaches the age of majority, whichever is first to 
occur. Plaintiff shall assume and pay the outstanding 
mortgage obligation on this house and real property, and hold 
Defendant harmless from it, and any future appreciation or 
depreciation related to this home and real property shall 
have no affect on the Defendant's lien, as established above, 
which shall remain fixed at $22,500.00. 
13. Personal Property. The personal property of the 
parties shall be distributed in the following manner: 
A. Plaintiff shall be awarded the following 
items of personal property, free and clear of any 
claim of the Defendant: 
(1) The 1983 Jeep automobile, 
valued at $9,800.00. In this regard, the 
Plaintiff is awarded the automobile, 
first on the grounds that the Defendant 
has been awarded other property which 
offsets the value of this automobile, and 
second on the grounds that the Plaintiff 
is in need of dependable, reliable 
transportation for her and the children's 
use and benefit. 
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(2) All household furnishings 
presently in the home, for the use and 
benefit of herself and the parties' 
children, including the television and 
VCR, except that the Defendant may be 
awarded the VCR if he purchases a 
replacement VCR for the use of the family 
at a reasonable cost of $200.00 to 
$3 00.00, and except for those items 
specifically awarded to the Defendant in 
paragraph B below. 
(3) Her own sports equipment, 
including water skis, bicycle and tennis 
ball machine. 
(4) Her personal effects and 
clothing. 
B. Defendant shall be awarded the following 
items of personal property, free and clear of any 
claim of the Plaintiff: 
(1) The 1988 Dodge truck, valued at 
$1,6500.00. The Court is unable to 
determine whether the Defendant has an 
interest in this vehicle based on 
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conflicts in Defendant's testimony and 
documentary evidence which was admitted. 
(2) The Cordova boat, valued at 
$7,000.00, together with any boating 
accessories and the hibachi. 
(3) Three snowmobiles, valued at 
$1,825.00. 
(4) 2-track Skidoo, valued at 
$550.00. 
(5) His own sports equipment, 
including water skis and bicycle. 
(6) Video camera. 
(7) V e t e r i n a r i a n tools and 
equipment, books and periodicals related 
to his profession. 
(8) The stereo which was a birthday 
gift to Defendant. 
(9) Chinese rug. 
(10) Freezer. 
(11) The tools, except that 
Plaintiff should be allowed to retain a 
sufficient amount for normal repairs on 
the home. 
(12) Lionel train. 
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(13) Coisant v a s e . 
(14) Lladro. 
(15) His personal effects and 
clothing, including his jewelry box. 
14. Attorney's Fees. The Court awards Plaintiff the 
sum of $3,939.65, as and for the Defendant's contribution 
towards the Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs and 
judgment is entered against the Defendant accordingly. 
15. Compliance. Each of the parties is ordered to do 
all things necessary to carry out and achieve each and every 
provision of this Decree. — 7 J 
DATED this /- J day of Jauuaiy, 1939. 
BY THE COURT: 
- / <JU-*>£ 
HOMER WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
Approved as/to substance and form: 
KENTMTKASTING / Date 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the j%(Q day of January, 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of 
Divorce was hand-delivered to the following: 
David S. Dolowitz, Esq, 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
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FILED DISTRICT SOUW i 
Third Judicial District 
KENT M. KASTING (1772) 
DART, ADAMSON 4 KASTING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff By 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v, : 
: Civil No, D87-4967 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, : 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
Defendant. : 
oOo; 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
the 17th and 18th days of August, 1988. The Plaintiff 
appeared in person and was represented by her counsel, Kent 
M. Kasting, Esq., and the Defendant appeared in person and 
was represented by his counsel, David S. Dolowitz, Esq., the 
parties were sworn, testimony was taken of the parties and 
other witnesses, documentary evidence was introduced and the 
matter was argued to the Court. The Court considered all of 
the foregoing and ruled from the bench. Being fully advised 
in the matter, the Court now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Jurisdiction. The Plaintiff and Defendant are 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and have been 
\l\i CO WW ^ 
so for more than three months immediately prior to the filing 
of this action for divorce. 
2. Marriage Information. The Plaintiff and Defendant 
were married on the 26th day of August, 1974, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and separated on the 26th day of December, 1987. 
3. Decree of Divorce. During the course of this 
marriage, irreconcilable differences have arisen between the 
parties to the extent that the parties no longer desire to 
live together or to continue the marriage relationship, and 
the Court finds that each of the parties should be entitled 
to a Decree of Divorce from the other, which Decree should be 
final upon signing and entry. 
4. Injunction. The Court finds that the parties have 
had altercations between themselves in terms of fights, 
arguments and other unacceptable behavior. Based on that, 
each party is permanently enjoined and restrained from in any 
way bothering, harming or annoying the other; from in any way 
making disparaging remarks about the other in front of the 
children or any third parties; and from coming on or to the 
residential premises of the parties. 
5. Child Custody and Visitation. Four children have 
been born as issue of this marriage, namely, Jeffrey, born 
July 12, 1976; John, born April 30, 1978; and twins, Julie 
and Jennifer, born October 9, 1980. The parties stipulated 
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that Plaintiff would be awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of these children. The Court finds that 
Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be awarded such 
permanent care, custody and control of these minor children, 
subject to Defendant's reasonable rights of visitation, which 
rights of visitation should include the following: 
A. Alternating weekends; 
B. One evening each week until 8:00 o'clock 
p.m. 
C. Alternating red-letter holidays; 
D. Christmas visitation beginning Christmas 
Day at noon, until December 26th at 8:00 o'clock 
p.m., and one-half of the Christmas vacation then 
remaining; 
E. Thanksgiving in odd-numbered years; 
F. Defendant's birthday; 
G. Father's Day; 
H. One-half of each child's birthday, when 
that birthday falls on a non-school day; or 6:00 
o'clock p.m. to 8:00 o'clock p.m., if that birthday 
falls on a school day; or at such other times as 
the parties may agree between them; 
I. Six weeks each summer, not necessarily 
3 
consecutive, and as may be agreed upon by the 
parties. 
6. Present Income and Expenses. The Plaintiff has 
rental income on pre-marital property of $500.00 per month 
and expenses related to that rental income of $340.00 per 
month, leaving a net monthly income from that property of 
$160.00 per month. At the time of trial, Plaintiff was 
employed at Utah Farm Bureau, with a net monthly income of 
$770.00. The Plaintiff's estimated actual and anticipated 
monthly expenses for herself and the four children, as 
reflected on Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 received by the Court, was 
$2,027.00. 
The Defendant testified that he received $2,000.00 per 
month from his employment as a doctor of veterinarian 
medicine and an additional $350.00 per month from barn rental 
on a barn in Park City, which he testified was a gift from 
his father, for a total monthly income, according to his 
testimony, of $2,350.00. He further testified he had income 
taxes of $154.89 and business expenses of $1,002.31, leaving 
him total monthly deductions of $1,157.20 and a net monthly 
income of $1,192.80, as was reflected on the information 
contained on Defendant's Exhibit 31. The Defendant further 
testified that he had estimated actual and anticipated 
monthly expenses of $2,049.60, as reflected on Defendant's 
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Exhibit 36. The Court considered each parties' testimony, 
the Exhibits referred to above and the tax returns filed by 
the parties and accepted into evidence (Plaintiff's Exhibits 
1 through 6), all of which were admitted as evidence. 
Based upon the review of all of those documents and the 
testimony on the parties, the Court finds that the Defendant 
receives more money by way of monthly income than was 
reflected on Defendant's Exhibit 36. The Court further finds 
that the Defendant is employed by his father and has been so 
since the start of the marriage, and that based on the 
Defendant's testimony as to what he was paid at the start of 
this relationship and what he is presently paid, the Court 
finds that Defendant was either overpaid when he started the 
relationship or is underpaid at the present time. The Court 
finds that it is the Defendant's intention to continue the 
employment relationship with his father and that the 
Defendant has substantial ability as a doctor of veterinarian 
medicine. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds it is 
reasonable for the Defendant to pay the following sums by way 
of child support and alimony. 
7. Child Support, Commencing with the month of 
September, 1988, Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff the 
sum of $150.00 per month for each of the four minor children 
of the parties, as child support, for a total child support 
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obligation of $600.00 per month. This child support shall 
continue until each child reaches the age of eighteen or 
graduates from high school in his normal year of graduation, 
whichever occurs last. 
8. Alimony. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has a 
college education with a teaching certificate, but that her 
certificate is not presently renewed. At the time of trial, 
the Plaintiff was employed at Utah Farm Bureau, but it was 
expected that that employment was due to end on August 19, 
1988. However, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is capable 
of finding good, gainful substitute employment. 
The Defendant has chosen to be employed by his father at 
a salary which appears to be less than he could make in 
another independent employment situation, and it appears that 
the Defendant has the ability to earn more than he presently 
does. The Court further received conflicting testimony as to 
whether or nor the tax returns of the parties accurately 
reflected the amount of monies available to meet the family's 
financial needs, and the Court finds that the tax returns 
appear to understate the actual net income that was available 
to the parties during the marriage for family and living 
expenses. 
The Court further finds that the Plaintiff did assist 
the Defendant in completing his education in veterinarian 
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school by her employment, by her caring for the home and 
raising the children. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds it to be 
reasonable that commencing with the month of September, 1988, 
the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $150.00 
per month, as and for alimony, for a period of five years. 
At the end of five years, that alimony award should be 
reduced to the sum of $1.00 per year for an additional five-
year period, or until such time as the Plaintiff remarries, 
cohabits or dies, whichever of the four events is first to 
occur. 
9. Health Insurance. The Court finds that the 
Defendant has available to him or is able to obtain adequate 
health insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor 
children of the parties. It is reasonable that the Defendant 
should provide such health insurance on each child during 
each child's respective period of minority. It is further 
reasonable that the Defendant cooperate with the Plaintiff to 
assist her in converting their present health insurance 
coverage to individual coverage for the Plaintiff under the 
provisions of Cobra. It is further reasonable that the 
Plaintiff shall be responsible for her own health insurance 
premiums and medical expenses. 
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10. Uninsured Medical Expenses, It is reasonable that 
any medical, dental, optometric and orthodontic expenses of 
the children not covered by insurance should be shared 
equally by the parties. 
11. Life Insurance. The Court finds that the Defendant 
presently has a life insurance policy on his life, with a 
face value of $90,000.00, and it is reasonable that the 
Defendant should continue in force that life insurance 
policy, with the Plaintiff and each of the four minor 
children to be named as equal beneficiaries thereunder, for 
so long as the Defendant has obligations of alimony and child 
support to the Plaintiff. 
12. Hillrise Circle Home. The Court finds that the 
home and real property on Hillrise Circle was obtained by the 
Plaintiff prior to the marriage of the parties. The home was 
purchased by her prior to the marriage with certain personal 
injury proceeds also received by her prior to the marriage. 
The Court further finds that Plaintiff and Defendant have 
both invested labor and expense in maintaining the home, but 
also finds that both benefitted from the income which this 
home generated as rental property and which was received 
during the marriage and was used by both of the parties for 
day-to-day normal and necessary family expenses. Based on 
that, the Court finds that the Hillrise Circle home, and any 
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appreciation related to this home, belongs to the Plaintiff 
and should be awarded to her free and clear of any claim of 
the Defendant. Defendant should execute a Quit-Claim Deed in 
the Plaintiff's favor in relation to this property. 
13. Chris Lane Home. The Court finds that the parties 
have an interest in a home and real property located at 7 049 
Chris Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah. The home has a fair market 
value of $92,000.00 and a present mortgage obligation of 
approximately $47,000.00, for a net equity of $45,000.00. 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff and the four minor 
children of the parties are in need of this residence and 
should be awarded the exclusive use and occupancy of the 
same. However, Plaintiff's interest in this home shall be 
subject to a non-interest bearing equitable lien in the 
Defendant for one-half of the present equity in the home, as 
found by the Court, to-wit: the lien amount should be 
$22,500.00. This lien shall be paid to Defendant when the 
Plaintiff remarries, cohabits, sells the home or moves from 
the home, or when the youngest child reaches the age of 
majority, whichever is first to occur. It is reasonable that 
the Plaintiff should assume and pay the outstanding mortgage 
obligation on this house and real property, and hold 
Defendant harmless from it, and any future appreciation or 
depreciation related to this home and real property should 
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have no affect on the Defendant's lien, as established above, 
which shall remain fixed at $22,500.00. 
14, Personal Property. The Court finds that during the 
course of the marriage the parties have acquired certain 
items of personal property, which should be distributed to 
the parties in the following manner: 
A. Plaintiff should be awarded the following 
items of personal property, free and clear of any 
claim of the Defendant: 
(1) The 1983 Jeep automobile, 
valued at $9,800.00. In this regard, the 
Plaintiff is awarded the automobile, 
first on the grounds that the Defendant 
has been awarded other property which 
offsets the value of this automobile, and 
second on the grounds that the Plaintiff 
is in need of dependable, reliable 
transportation for her and the children's 
use and benefit. 
(2) All household furnishings 
presently in the home, for the use and 
benefit of herself and the parties' 
children, including the television and 
VCR, except that the Defendant may be 
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awarded the VCR if he purchases a 
replacement VCR for the use of the family 
at a reasonable cost of $200.00 to 
$3 00.00, and except for those items 
specifically awarded to the Defendant in 
paragraph B below. 
(3) Her own sports equipment, 
including water skis, bicycle and tennis 
ball machine. 
(4) Her personal effects and 
clothing. 
B, Defendant should be awarded the following 
items of personal property, free and clear of any 
claim of the Plaintiff: 
(1) The 1988 Dodge truck, valued at 
$1,6500.00. The Court is unable to 
determine whether the Defendant has an 
interest in this vehicle based on 
conflicts in Defendant's testimony and 
documentary evidence which was admitted. 
(2) The Cordova boat, valued at 
$7,000.00, together with any boating 
accessories and the hibachi. 
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(3) Three snowmobiles, va lued a t 
$1 ,825 .00 . 
(4) 2 - t r a c k S k i d o o , v a l u e d a t 
$550.00, 
(5) H i s own s p o r t s e q u i p m e n t , 
i n c l u d i n g water s k i s and b i c y c l e . 
(6) Video camera. 
(7) V e t e r i n a r i a n tools and 
equipment, books and periodicals related 
to his profession. 
(8) The stereo which was a birthday 
gift to Defendant. 
(9) Chinese rug. 
(10) Freezer. 
(11) The tools, except that 
Plaintiff should be allowed to retain a 
sufficient amount for normal repairs on 
the home, 
(12) Lionel train. 
(13) Coisant vase. 
(14) Lladro. 
(15) H i s p e r s o n a l e f f e c t s and 
c l o t h i n g , i nc lud ing h i s j ewe l ry box. 
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15. Gifts During the Marriage. The Court finds that 
during the course of the marriage, various sums of money v/ere 
given to the parties by the Defendant's father, including an 
$18,500.00 down payment on the Chris Lane home. The Court 
further finds that during the time these gifts were made, 
Defendant was employed by his father and was never paid more 
than $2,000.00 per month as a doctor of veterinarian 
medicine. Based upon the testimony of the parties, the 
testimony of the Defendant's father and the documents 
received into evidence related to these contributions, the 
Court finds that any such gifts were intended by Defendant's 
father as a gift to both parties, with those monies being 
contributed to the marital estate and used in connection with 
the maintenance of the family during the course of this 
marriage. The Court finds that the money so transferred by 
the Defendant's father are not separate property of the 
Defendant, but rather were given to both parties for their 
mutual use and benefit during the marriage, and the Court has 
considered those monies in the overall property distribution 
set forth in the Findings. 
16. Attorney's Fees. Plaintiff presented evidence that 
her attorney had expended or would expend in connection with 
the final document preparation and post-trial Motions the 
total sum of $7,879.30 in attorney's fees and costs 
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit 39) • The evidence reflects and the 
Court finds those fees to be reasonable and necessary. The 
Court further finds that Plaintiff does not have sufficient 
funds to pay her lawyer and that the Defendant has the 
ability to pay a portion of Plaintiff's attorney's fees and 
costs. The hourly rate charged by Plaintiff's counsel is 
reasonable and consistent with the hourly rates charged in 
the community for similar services and the hours expended by 
Plaintiff's counsel in connection with this case were 
necessary. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that a 
reasonable award of attorney's fees in this case is the sum 
of $3,939.65, as and for the Defendant's contribution towards 
the Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs and judgment may be 
entered against him accordingly. 
17. Contributions of the Plaintiff Towards the 
Education of the Defendant. The Court finds that the 
Plaintiff did assist the Defendant in completing veterinarian 
medical school. The Court finds that Plaintiff did not give 
him the money, nor did she pay for tuition and books, but 
that she cared for the home, worked during the summer and 
worked during school. She further bore the four children and 
has been the primary caretaker and raised the children while 
the Defendant went to school and thereafter, while he has 
14 
worked as a doctor of veterinarian medicine. Based on those 
contributions, the Court finds that it is reasonable to 
consider these contributions of the Plaintiff and the Court 
has done so in connection with its award of alimony, as set 
forth in paragraph 3 of these Findings. 
18. Courts Ruling. The Court hereby incorporates by 
reference each and every aspect of its ruling from the bench 
made at the conclusion of trial in this matter, to-wit: 
August 17, 1988, and specifically makes that ruling a part of 
these Findings of Fact. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
the following; 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each of the parties are entitled to a Decree of 
Divorce, one from the other, on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences, which Decree shall be final upon signing and 
entry. 
2. Each party is permanently enjoined and restrained 
from in any way bothering, harming or annoying the other; 
from in any way making disparaging remarks about the other in 
front of the children or any third parties; and from coming 
on or to the residential premises of the parties. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of the minor children of the parties, subject to 
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Defendant's reasonable rights of visitation, as more 
particularly set forth in paragraph 5 of the Findings of 
Fact. 
4. Plaintiff is awarded child support from the 
Defendant in the amount and upon the terms provided in 
paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded alimony from the Defendant in 
the amount and upon the terms provided in paragraph 8 of the 
Findings of Fact, 
6. Defendant is ordered to provide health insurance 
coverage for the benefit of the minor children of the 
parties, as provided in paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact. 
7. Any uninsured medical, dental, optometric and 
orthodontic expenses of the children not covered by insurance 
shall be shared equally by the parties. 
8. Defendant is ordered to continue in force the 
current life insurance policy, as provided in paragraph 11 of 
the Findings of Fact. 
9. The real and personal property of the parties is 
awarded, as provided in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the 
Findings of Fact. 
10. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of 
$3,939.65, as and for Defendant's contribution towards the 
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Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs and judgment shall be 
entered against him accordingly 
DATED this /- ^ 
BY THE COURT: 
day of January/ 1989, 
/ 
7^~ J^-i •L -C 
HOMER WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to substance and form: 
V 
1 y 
/ ^ , 
KENT M. KASTING 
Attorney for Plaintiff' 
Date 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 30 day of January, 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions or Law was hand-delivered to the 
following: 
David S. Dolowitz, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for Jl i^tl- v. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
A t t o r n e y s f o r D e f e n d a n t 
5 2 5 E a s t 100 S o u t h , S u i t e 500 
P. CL Box 1 1 0 0 8 
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I N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 





OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
DECREE 
Civil No- D87-4967 
Judge Homer F. "Wilkinson 
* * * * * 
Defendant objects to plaintiff's proposed Finding of 
Fact No. 13 on page 9 of the Findings of Fact in that it fails 
to include as an event which would trigger the defendant being 
able to secure his equity from the home with the youngest 
child of the parties attaining majority. 
The defendant further objects to paragraph 15 of the 
plaintiff s proposed Findings of Fact on pages 12 and 13 in 
that it is contrary to the testimony and the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Mortenson v. Mortenson, 
760 P. 2d 304 (Utah 1988). 
Defendant objects to Paragraph 12 (page 5) of the 
plaintiff' s proposed Decree of Divorce in that it does not 
properly include, as an event requiring payment of the lien 
awarded to the defendant, the youngest child attaining 
majority. The award is contrary to the evidence and violates 
the principles of law articulated by the Supreme Court of Utah 
in Mortenson v. Mortenson, 760 P. 2d 304 (Utah 1988). 
DATED this 2 7 day of January, 1989. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ ~3/' 
Attorney foi Defendanr^ 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Objections 
this 2^ >> day of January, 1989, to: 
Kent M. Kasting 
Attorney at Law 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 10 1 
^{(Jl&l 
[)i DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (089 9) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE/THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 






OBJECTIONS TO AMENDED 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND DECREE 
Civil No. D87r4967 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
* * * * * 
Defendant objects to the revised Findings of Fact 
submitted by the plaintiff, as follows: 
1. Paragraph 6, page 5, wherein it states, in lines 6 
through 9, that: 
[T]he court finds that the 
Defendant receives more money by way of 
monthly income than was reflected on 
Defendant's Exhibit 36., 
as there is no evidence to support that Finding. 
2. The defendant objects to the language in proposed 
Paragraph 15, on page 13: 
[T]he court finds that such gifts 
were intended by Defendant' s father as a 
gift to both parties, with those monies 
being contributed to the marital estate 
and used in conjunction with the 
maintenance of the family during the 
course of the marriage. , 
on the grounds that said Finding is directly contrary to the 
evidence in this matter. 
3. Defendant further objects to the Findings in 
Paragraph 13 on pages 9 and 10, wherein the court failed to 
apply the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Mortenson v. 
Mortenson, 760 P. 2d 304 (Utah 1988), in failing to return 
gifts given to the defendant by his father during the marriage 
which were expended on the Chris Lane home to the defendant. 
4. Defendant objects to Paragraph 12, pages 5 and 6 
of the Decree of Divorce, wherein the gifts given to the 
defendant by his father during the course of the marriage and 
placed in the Chris Lane home are not returned to him in 
violation of the principles articulated by the Supreme Court 
of Utah in Mortenson v. Mortenson, 760 P. 2d 304 (Utah 1988). 
DATED this <£ day of February, 198 9. x 
J 
DAVID S. iDOLOWtTZ O 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered, a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Objections 
this (p day of February, 1989, to: 
Kent M. Kasting 
Attorney at Law 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 




DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Defendant 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
D e f e n d a n t -
MOTION FOR RELIEF 
FROM JUDGMENT 
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
FOR A NEW TRIAL 
C i v i l No, D87-4969 
J u d g e Homer F. W i l k i n s o n 
* * * * * 
The d e f e n d a n t , by and t h r o u g h h i s a t t o r n e y , moves t h i s 
c o u r t pursuant t o Rules 59 and 60 of t h e Utah Rules of C i v i l 
P r o c e d u r e f o r r e l i e f from judgment , o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , 
f o r a new t r i a l on t h e i s s u e of t h e g i f t s t o de fendan t d u r i n g 
t h e c o u r s e of t h e m a r r i a g e by h i s f a t h e r on t h e grounds t h a t 
t h e c o u r t ' s r u l i n g i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r u l i n g of t h e 
Supreme C o u r t of t h e S t a t e of Utah i s s u e d on August 16, 1988, 
i n Mor tensen v. Mor tensen , 89 Utah Adv. Repor t s 7, P. 2d 
(Augus t 16, 1988) , i n t h a t t h e Utah Supreme Cour t 
d e c l a r e d : 
We c o n c l u d e t h a t i n Utah, t r i a l 
c o u r t s making ' e q u i t a b l e ' proper ty 
d i v i s i o n pursuant t o S e c t i o n 3 0 - 3 - 5 
s h o u l d , i n accordance wi th t h e r u l e 
p r e v a i l i n g i n m o s t o t h e r 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s and w i th the d i v i s i o n 
made i n many o f our own c a s e s , 
g e n e r a l l y award p r o p e r t y acquired bv 
one spouse bv g i f t and i n h e r i t a n c e 
d u r i n g t h e marr iage (or p r o p e r t y 
a c q u i r e d i n exchange t h e r e o f ) t o 
t h a t s p o u s e , t o g e t h e r w i t h any 
a p p r e c i a t i o n or enhancement of i t s 
v a l u e s . . . . . 89 Utah Adv. Rep. 
a t 9, 
(A copy of t h e f u l l d e c i s i o n i s a t tached t o t h i s Motion for 
t h e c o n v e n i e n c e o f t h e court . ) 
While t h e r e are e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e d e c l a r e d r u l e , none 
a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e i n s t a n t ca se . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h i s c o u r t 
s h o u l d e i t h e r reform i t s j udgment and g r a n t t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e 
$18 , 500. 00 g i f t g i v e n t o him by h i s f a t h e r , p l u s t h e i n c r e a s e 
i n va lue a f t e r purchase of t h e Chr i s Lane home a r e a s o n a b l e 
r a t e o f i n t e r e s t , o r award a new t r i a l on t h a t i s s u e . 
Defendant would f u r t h e r move t h e c o u r t t o r u l e t h a t 
r a t i o n a l a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Mor tensen d e c i s i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t 
a l l e q u i t y i n t h e home of t h e p a r t i e s a t C h r i s Lane s h o u l d be 
awarded t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . 
Whi le t h e Mor tensen d e c i s i o n s u p p o r t s t h e c o u r t i s 
c o r r e c t i n i t s r u l i n g i n t h e H i l l r i s e C i r c l e p r o p e r t y , i t 
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demonstrates that the court did not fully apply the doctrine 
and now must amend its judgment accordingly. Defendant would 
also point out to the court that its ruling in regard to the 
gifts, after hearing the testimony of Dr. Osguthorpe, the 
defendant' s father, is contrary to the ruling of the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Smith v. Smith, 738 P. 2d 655 (Utah App. 
1987)/ (copy attached for the convenience of the court), where 
the Court of Appeals ruled the trial court should hear and 
consider the testimony of a parent giving a gift to a couple 
that, even if the gift was put in both names for some reason, 
if the intent is to give it to only one of the children, that 
intent should be considered by the court. That decision read 
in conjunction with the Mortensen decision requires this court 
to effect the gift given by Dr. Osguthorpe to his son, the 
defendant, and reform the decision heretofore made in this 
matter accordingly. 
DATED this ?\*J day of MJ2^>f , 1988. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ ^/ 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true copy 
of the above and foregoing Motion this J? ^ day of September, 
1988, to: 
Mr. Kent Kasting 
Attorney at Law 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
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^/zxim 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
COHNE# RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P. CX Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
* * * * * 
JEANETTE OSGUTHORPE, ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
JERRY OSGUTHORPE, ) Civil No. D87-4967 
) Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * 
Defendant hereby give notice of his appeal of certain 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce executed in this matter on 
the 1st day of March, 1989, and entered by the clerk on the 
1st day of March, 1989, in particular, the defendant appeals 
the provisions of paragraph 6 which sets an amount to be paid 
as child support; paragraph 7 which awards alimony; paragraph 
11 which awarded the Hillrise Circle home to the plaintiff; 
Paragraph . 12 which awarded the Chris Lane home to the 
plaintiff; and failed to properly account for the gifts to 
the defendant by his father during the course of the 
marriage; and Paragraph 14 which awarded attorney's fees on 
behalf of the plaintiff. 
The defendant does not appeal any provision of the 
Decree of Divorce which is not specifically designated 
herein. 
DATED this 25L d*Y of March, 1989. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing Notice of Appeal, postage prepaid, 
this ^2^? day of March, 1989, to: 
Kent M. Kasting 
Attorney at Law 
310 South Main Street, Suite 13 30 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
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